THESIS
2017
Abstract
We extend Che and Kartik [7] to the multidimensional state space. The decision maker
consults an expert before making multiple independent decisions, then differences of opinion
will create an incentive for the expert to acquire information costly but burden their communication.
Under the assumption of correlated information acquisition and disclosure, in the n-dimensional
setting, we prove the existence of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and find when
all the experts have the same opinion with the decision maker, consulting one expert for all the
decisions is more beneficial than consulting several independent experts for different decisions.
In the two-dimensional case, we show that the decision maker will never choose an expert with
the same opinion in both dimensions....[
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We extend Che and Kartik [7] to the multidimensional state space. The decision maker
consults an expert before making multiple independent decisions, then differences of opinion
will create an incentive for the expert to acquire information costly but burden their communication.
Under the assumption of correlated information acquisition and disclosure, in the n-dimensional
setting, we prove the existence of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and find when
all the experts have the same opinion with the decision maker, consulting one expert for all the
decisions is more beneficial than consulting several independent experts for different decisions.
In the two-dimensional case, we show that the decision maker will never choose an expert with
the same opinion in both dimensions.
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