This study examines the phenomenon of land-biased urbanization in China in relation to the promotion incentives of city leaders. Using a panel data set on the political turnover of prefectural party secretaries from 2007 to 2012, I find that expanding urban constructed area and selling commercial and residential land, but not industrial land, significantly increase the career advancement probability of city leaders. Regression analyses show that chances for promotion are significantly higher among those either serving in large, populated cities or in the more affluent cities as measured by GDP per capita. Whereas municipal leaders in the former instance were assigned based on the “ties” with which they have had with their superiors, those in the latter instance earned their chan...[ Read more ]

This study examines the phenomenon of land-biased urbanization in China in relation to the promotion incentives of city leaders. Using a panel data set on the political turnover of prefectural party secretaries from 2007 to 2012, I find that expanding urban constructed area and selling commercial and residential land, but not industrial land, significantly increase the career advancement probability of city leaders. Regression analyses show that chances for promotion are significantly higher among those either serving in large, populated cities or in the more affluent cities as measured by GDP per capita. Whereas municipal leaders in the former instance were assigned based on the “ties” with which they have had with their superiors, those in the latter instance earned their chance by having the rare (and presumably valued) business experience of running a state-owned enterprise. Together, the empirical evidence shown suggests that the playing field for promotion in municipal China is not entirely equal among the competitors.