THESIS
2018
Abstract
This thesis investigates state employment – that is, how the state recruited, managed,
and remunerated its personnel – during the Song-Yuan-Ming period. By studying government
policies concerning entry into officialdom, opportunities for advancement, and emoluments
for civil and military officials and common soldiers, I argue that the method of service was
greatly impacted by the Mongol invasion, shifting from the incentivized method of the Song
(960-1279) to the semi-incentivized civil bureaucracy and hereditary military system of the
Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming (1368-1644). The increasingly non-incentivized nature of
service was paralleled by a decrease in state capacity and innovation among the officials.
While previous scholars have related this phenomenon to other issues such...[
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This thesis investigates state employment – that is, how the state recruited, managed,
and remunerated its personnel – during the Song-Yuan-Ming period. By studying government
policies concerning entry into officialdom, opportunities for advancement, and emoluments
for civil and military officials and common soldiers, I argue that the method of service was
greatly impacted by the Mongol invasion, shifting from the incentivized method of the Song
(960-1279) to the semi-incentivized civil bureaucracy and hereditary military system of the
Yuan (1271-1368) and Ming (1368-1644). The increasingly non-incentivized nature of
service was paralleled by a decrease in state capacity and innovation among the officials.
While previous scholars have related this phenomenon to other issues such as under-taxation,
I argue that the failure to incentivize the officials also played a major role.
Civil and military service in the Song was characterized by generous financial and
political compensations. During the Yuan, owing to ethnic prejudices and a desire to maintain
their traditional steppe institutions and customs, the Mongols could only incentivize a small
number of officials. Furthermore, the hereditary military system provided officers with far
too many unintentional incentives that allowed them to take advantage of their positions and
ultimately undermine the entire military system. Such problems not only did not disappear
with the Ming, but in some instances became worse. Methods of state employment is also
tied to state institutions and institutional capacity. Because the hereditary military system was
cost-effective, the Yuan and Ming states did not develop any complex financial institutions.
The Ming in particular was also hampered by a dynastic constitution that prevented any
serious reform. Moreover, the officials were not properly incentivized to tackle the problems.
Ultimately, this thesis highlights the important role of state employment in the study of state
formation and institutions.
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