THESIS
2020
Abstract
Governance under authoritarianism relies on the regime’s ability to gather accurate information
about the actions of government officials. In recent years, while a growing body of literature
demonstrates how authoritarian regimes such as China are increasingly capable of collecting
public opinion or supervising societal perceptions of the regime, monitoring the information
distortion of regime agents remains a challenge. The latter seems to be contingent on
administrative structure and is thus difficult to tackle. One of the most prevalent expressions
of local information distortion in authoritarian regimes is the collection of economic-related
data. Conventional work questioning the credibility of China’s sub-national GDP statistics
presumes a reporting system that allows local...[
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Governance under authoritarianism relies on the regime’s ability to gather accurate information
about the actions of government officials. In recent years, while a growing body of literature
demonstrates how authoritarian regimes such as China are increasingly capable of collecting
public opinion or supervising societal perceptions of the regime, monitoring the information
distortion of regime agents remains a challenge. The latter seems to be contingent on
administrative structure and is thus difficult to tackle. One of the most prevalent expressions
of local information distortion in authoritarian regimes is the collection of economic-related
data. Conventional work questioning the credibility of China’s sub-national GDP statistics
presumes a reporting system that allows local governments to collect and report their own GDP
one-level up. In this context, local authorities are often motivated by better career prospects to
exaggerate their GDP figures. The rationale is deeply rooted in Max Weber’s theory on
bureaucracy, which highlights expertise and knowledge as the sources of bureaucratic power
vis-à-vis their “political masters.” A competing reality is that starting from 2018, various
provinces and cities admitted their failure to reach growth targets. How can this be explained?
Based on fieldwork in Zhejiang and Shanghai from 2018 to 2020, an original database and
secondary materials, this thesis explores the mechanisms through which China manages to curb
local statistical falsification. Specifically, as a pioneer of China’s statistical reform, Zhejiang
implemented a “one-level-down” statistical calculation system to replace a traditional “bottom-up”
reporting one, such that prefectural GDP figures will be announced directly by provincial
superiors. In addition, the establishment of a national-level platform for firms to directly report
data diminishes the ability of local statistical bureau to conceal falsification behavior.
Meanwhile, the recently established possibility that cadres in local statistical bureaus could be
disciplined directly by upper level statistical agencies, have de-linked the formerly shared
incentives between local statistical agencies and their corresponding local governments. Hence,
even if local governments are still inclined to pressure local statistical bureau officials, cadres
who possess an informational advantage over governmental authorities are incentivized to
avoid being punished by their statistical bureau superiors. This thesis sheds lights on the
potential of curbing intra-regime information manipulation introduced by a centralized
performance-setting system.
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