In non-democratic regimes, it remains a considerable challenge to reconcile the long-term, broad interests of the state with the short-term, specific interests of localities, particularly in mega projects that necessitate substantial resource extraction from local regions. In the context of the People’s Republic of China, particularly during the late Mao era (1969-1976), this central-local tension is further complicated by the “tiao-kuai” relations. Existing scholarship primarily relies on a state capacity-oriented approach, emphasizing the external structure of policymaking. This thesis, however, adopts a more process-oriented, contextualized approach by examining local archives of two railways constructed during the Third Front Construction in southwestern China from 1970 to 1973, whi...[ Read more ]

In non-democratic regimes, it remains a considerable challenge to reconcile the long-term, broad interests of the state with the short-term, specific interests of localities, particularly in mega projects that necessitate substantial resource extraction from local regions. In the context of the People’s Republic of China, particularly during the late Mao era (1969-1976), this central-local tension is further complicated by the “tiao-kuai” relations. Existing scholarship primarily relies on a state capacity-oriented approach, emphasizing the external structure of policymaking. This thesis, however, adopts a more process-oriented, contextualized approach by examining local archives of two railways constructed during the Third Front Construction in southwestern China from 1970 to 1973, which enables a “typical” authoritarian state to justify their extractive policies to localities. It argues that the central authorities and local officials manage to bridge the gap between long-term general welfare and specific short-term local interests through a process of “negotiated mobilization.” This intra-bureaucratic negotiation relies on a normative platform of public goods provision, enhanced by central political discourse agreed upon by both the state bureaucrats and the local officials. Local officials leverage the central discourse to voice their grievances and claims contentiously, while the state fully utilizes the normative platform to identify and support localities through hidden assistance or acquiescence. The thesis exemplifies this by examining the diversion of state-designated resources to local use. It delineates the typology, handling suggestions, and hidden forms of diversionary behaviors, as well as the negotiations over Mao’s thoughts, which both sides used to proclaim their interests. This thesis offers a valuable perspective for reexamining central-local relations in non-democracies, especially Mao’s China, and provides a feasible explanation for the relationship between pre-reform and post-reform China.

Keywords: Third Front Construction, Central-local interests, “tiao-kuai” relations, negotiated mobilization