THESIS
2023
1 online resource (xxi, 199 pages) : color illustrations, 1 color map
Abstract
The advancements in real-time information technologies and liberalization of the transportation
market have prospered an array of shared mobility transportation service
providers (TSPs), such as ridesourcing, carsharing, etc. The flux of these TSPs constantly
results in intensified competition among them, and between them and public TSPs. Private
TSPs are typically self-interested entities. They seek to maximize their profitability
in such highly competitive environments by making excessive capital investments and
setting lower service prices, thereby capturing as much market share as possible from
other TSPs. This not only poses a significant threat to existing public transportation
networks but also exacerbates the business environment among TSPs.
The emergence of these TSPs also brin...[
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The advancements in real-time information technologies and liberalization of the transportation
market have prospered an array of shared mobility transportation service
providers (TSPs), such as ridesourcing, carsharing, etc. The flux of these TSPs constantly
results in intensified competition among them, and between them and public TSPs. Private
TSPs are typically self-interested entities. They seek to maximize their profitability
in such highly competitive environments by making excessive capital investments and
setting lower service prices, thereby capturing as much market share as possible from
other TSPs. This not only poses a significant threat to existing public transportation
networks but also exacerbates the business environment among TSPs.
The emergence of these TSPs also brings some opportunities, usually through cooperation
with other TSPs. Research findings indicate that integrating shared mobility transportation
with public transportation in a multimodal transportation system can increase the
potential for revenue. A prevalent business model for cooperation entails shared mobility
TSPs offering first- and last-mile services to public transportation travelers, acting as a
supplementary service. The cooperation among private TSPs also provides additional
benefits. These TSPs can improve resource utilization, mitigate risks, and reduce the
cost of capital by seeking cooperation with others, even with their competitors.
Cooperation among competitors is termed as coopetition, which is becoming increasingly
prevalent in transportation networks. However, the impact of coopetition is uncertain
for TSPs and travelers. To examine the potential impact, this thesis focuses primarily on three common issues, as demonstrated below.
We first investigate how shared mobility and public TSPs compete and cooperate with
each other. A multi-leader single-follower game is proposed to formulate the competitive
and cooperative interactions between them where public and shared mobility TSPs
are leaders and travelers are the common follower. We find that small shared mobility
operators (with a limited budget) are likely to cooperate with the public transportation
operator. We also find that subsidy plays an important role in cooperative or competitive
relationships and a well-tailored subsidy scheme can achieve a win-win outcome for both
operators and travelers.
Next, we investigate the combined impact of TSPs’ market power and service congestion
effects on the competition and cooperation relationship between TSPs. We consider TSPs
can exchange their short-term usage right for resources. The end users is sensitive to both
service price and service congestion. We formulate the interaction between TSPs into a
sequential game. We derive the conditions when TSPs would like to coopete or compete
with each other. The subsequent impacts on social welfare, TSPs, and end users are
investigated.
Building on the findings of the above studies, we further address a network pricing problem
in a competitive environment where multiple TSPs coexist in the same transportation
network, and compete and cooperate simultaneously with each other. We take the
perspective of a network regulator that seeks to increase ridership in a multimodal transportation
network by providing non-additive, path-based subsidies to travelers. TSPs
adjust link fares according to the subsidy policy. A single-leader multi-follower game
is formulated wherein the leader represents the network regulator and multiple followers
represent the TSPs. Numerical results reveal the impact of TSP competition in the transportation
network pricing problems and shed novel insights into the design of optimal
path-based subsidy policies.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the complex dynamics of competition
and cooperation among TSPs, by examining the impact of TSPs’ market power,
service congestion, and pricing strategies. Their related impact on TSPs, travelers and
the transportation networks are investigated. The results of this thesis provide valuable insights into improving the compatibility of different TSPs and enhancing the sustainability
of the multimodal transportation networks.
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