The paper argues with empirical analysis on Hong Kong and Taiwan that social mobility reduces class voting at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the mobility of skilled workers to service workers weakens the social base of a working class-based political party. Class is much more important to political cleavage in Taiwan than in Hong Kong. In Taiwan, there is a clear difference in class preferences for two major political camps- The Pan Green Coalition and The Pan Blue Coalition. However, in Hong Kong, the class effect is only significant when choosing between the Liberal Party and the Pro-democracy Camp. Empirical analysis shows that the proportion of skilled workers to service workers in Taiwan is larger than that in Hong Kong. Service workers in Hong Kong and Taiwan...[ Read more ]

The paper argues with empirical analysis on Hong Kong and Taiwan that social mobility reduces class voting at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the mobility of skilled workers to service workers weakens the social base of a working class-based political party. Class is much more important to political cleavage in Taiwan than in Hong Kong. In Taiwan, there is a clear difference in class preferences for two major political camps- The Pan Green Coalition and The Pan Blue Coalition. However, in Hong Kong, the class effect is only significant when choosing between the Liberal Party and the Pro-democracy Camp. Empirical analysis shows that the proportion of skilled workers to service workers in Taiwan is larger than that in Hong Kong. Service workers in Hong Kong and Taiwan are at the same level of the class hierarchy as skilled workers in terms of monthly income but they do not share class identity and self-reported social strata, and thus have different political preferences. At the micro level, it is found that the intragenerational immobile in Taiwan, and intergenerational and intragenerational immobile in Hong Kong have more distinct political preferences than the more general class groups. My analysis also shows that intergenerational and intragenerational immobile have much more distinct choice of party fights for most individual’s class interests, class identity and self-reported social strata. So, I believe that mobility leads to ambiguous choices of party fights for most individual’s class interest, class identity and self-reported social strata, and consequently reduces class effects on political preferences. In other words, at the macro level, the mobility of skilled workers to service workers shrinks the social cleavage based on class, and at the micro level, an individual mobility experience diminishes the class effect on voting choice.