I examine whether cross-listing of non-U.S. firms on the U.S. exchanges affect the size, concentration and shares held by foreign banks of their syndicated loans. I find that cross-listing increases the size of syndicate and reduces the syndicate concentration. Cross-listing also leads to foreign lenders holding a larger portion in syndicated loans. Good legal system, strong creditor protection, low corruption and high level of economic development weaken the effect of cross-listing on loan syndicate structure. Cross-listing significantly affects the probability of a loan with a foreign lead lender, while domestic listing has no such effect. These results imply that the improvement of the information environment due to cross-listing can increase the participation in the loan syn...[ Read more ]

I examine whether cross-listing of non-U.S. firms on the U.S. exchanges affect the size, concentration and shares held by foreign banks of their syndicated loans. I find that cross-listing increases the size of syndicate and reduces the syndicate concentration. Cross-listing also leads to foreign lenders holding a larger portion in syndicated loans. Good legal system, strong creditor protection, low corruption and high level of economic development weaken the effect of cross-listing on loan syndicate structure. Cross-listing significantly affects the probability of a loan with a foreign lead lender, while domestic listing has no such effect. These results imply that the improvement of the information environment due to cross-listing can increase the participation in the loan syndicate, and make foreign lenders participate in a syndicated loan more often.

Keywords:Cross Listing, Syndicate Structure, information Asymmetry