A salient feature of social services provision in China is that there exist considerable variations across regions and through different time periods. Focusing on the municipal fiscal expenditure on education, we find that the variations of municipal social services provision are systematically patterned on the municipal mayors’ career concerns. Specifically, with a mayor whose in-office time has exceeded 5 years, that is, a full term, the municipality spends 4.3% more fiscal expenditure on education. We argue that such effect is mainly driven by the municipal mayor’s shift of major concerns and an increasing demand for enhancing reputation among local populace when expecting a low promotion probability since staying at the same position for more than one full term without rotation or p...[ Read more ]

A salient feature of social services provision in China is that there exist considerable variations across regions and through different time periods. Focusing on the municipal fiscal expenditure on education, we find that the variations of municipal social services provision are systematically patterned on the municipal mayors’ career concerns. Specifically, with a mayor whose in-office time has exceeded 5 years, that is, a full term, the municipality spends 4.3% more fiscal expenditure on education. We argue that such effect is mainly driven by the municipal mayor’s shift of major concerns and an increasing demand for enhancing reputation among local populace when expecting a low promotion probability since staying at the same position for more than one full term without rotation or promotion usually predicts a low promotion probability in the future. We also find that the effect is even stronger among older mayors. But our empirical evidence does not support the argument that a locally promoted local leader is a blessing for local social service provision as Persson and Zhuravskaya (2008 and 2011) have suggested.

Keywords: Social services provision; terms; promotion probability