While rewards and punishment are both important in agent control, existing literature on cadre management in China mainly focuses on reward (i.e. promotion). This thesis explores the disciplining of government officials by examining the use of sanction. It shows that the party-state has adopted different approaches to deal with erring agents in light of the severity and nature of their malfeasance. The party-state's approaches reflect its balancing of the cost with the need of disciplining malfeasant agents....[ Read more ]

While rewards and punishment are both important in agent control, existing literature on cadre management in China mainly focuses on reward (i.e. promotion). This thesis explores the disciplining of government officials by examining the use of sanction. It shows that the party-state has adopted different approaches to deal with erring agents in light of the severity and nature of their malfeasance. The party-state's approaches reflect its balancing of the cost with the need of disciplining malfeasant agents.

The thesis examines the party-state's use of sanction through the case of anti-corruption and the case of officials' duty related malfeasance (e.g., in the coal mine accidents). In anticorruption, the state authority uses the strategy of selectively and severely punishing certain agents to balance the cost and the need of disciplining. On the other hand, in dealing with agents who have committed non-corruption malfeasance, the state authority tends to be more tolerant. The disciplining of state agents in China suggests that the disciplinary institutions can be compromised because of the party-state's concern over various costs. But the discipline may still be credible because malfeasant agents still face uncertainty when they commit malfeasance.