THESIS
2012
vii, 60 p. : col. ill. ; 30 cm
Abstract
We introduce a non-domestic government into the analysis of electoral competition
with special interest groups. The non-domestic government sets its policy to influence
the electoral prospect of candidate it prefers through special interest groups. The interest groups make contributions and vote directly for their aligned political parties.
In the context, the determinants that the external government could have a role in
electoral outcome of domestic politics are investigated. The determinants include the
extent of affected interest groups, the bene
fits offered to interest groups, and the fraction of informed voters. Using the 2012 Taiwan presidential election data, we find
evidence supporting that the party who advocates cross-strait trade is more likely to
lose presidential...[
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We introduce a non-domestic government into the analysis of electoral competition
with special interest groups. The non-domestic government sets its policy to influence
the electoral prospect of candidate it prefers through special interest groups. The interest groups make contributions and vote directly for their aligned political parties.
In the context, the determinants that the external government could have a role in
electoral outcome of domestic politics are investigated. The determinants include the
extent of affected interest groups, the bene
fits offered to interest groups, and the fraction of informed voters. Using the 2012 Taiwan presidential election data, we find
evidence supporting that the party who advocates cross-strait trade is more likely to
lose presidential election when more interest groups may suffer from the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement.
Key Words: Electoral Competition, Special Interest Groups, Bilateral Trade, Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
JEL Codes: D72, D78, F14
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