THESIS
2014
xii, 174 pages : illustrations, maps ; 30 cm
Abstract
In this study, I examine the geographical distribution of power elites in an authoritarian
regime and investigate its causes and consequences using an exhaustive biographical dataset
containing all of the Central Committee (CC) members of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) during 1945-2012. I match their birthplaces in a geographic information system and
arrive at the following two stylized facts. First, the Chinese power elites are unevenly
distributed across regions, and the pattern of the geographical distribution has changed over
time. Second, the elites are geographically concentrated. The concentration was initially very
high before the Cultural Revolution (CR, 1966-1976), but sharply decreased during the CR
and then remained at a certain level after 1982. I empirically tes...[
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In this study, I examine the geographical distribution of power elites in an authoritarian
regime and investigate its causes and consequences using an exhaustive biographical dataset
containing all of the Central Committee (CC) members of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) during 1945-2012. I match their birthplaces in a geographic information system and
arrive at the following two stylized facts. First, the Chinese power elites are unevenly
distributed across regions, and the pattern of the geographical distribution has changed over
time. Second, the elites are geographically concentrated. The concentration was initially very
high before the Cultural Revolution (CR, 1966-1976), but sharply decreased during the CR
and then remained at a certain level after 1982. I empirically test the roles of power sharing
and meritocracy in shaping the preceding facts. Although initially, a large proportion of CC
members were natives of the revolutionary bases built by the CCP during 1927-1937, an
increasing number began to be selected from non-revolutionary bases, especially after the CR,
which explains why the pattern of geographic distribution has changed and the concentration
has decreased over time. However, the merit-based selection introduced after the CR has
made the distribution uneven and slightly concentrated. Last, but not the least, this study
shows that the distribution of power elites matters to the economic prosperity of the elites’
birth regions. A one increase in the number of CC members leads to about a one percentage
point increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, an effect I suggest is caused by
resource allocation.
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