THESIS
2015
Abstract
This paper incorporates political conflict into a traditional global game framework to explain events such like civil war. A group of citizens may choose uprising during a civil war while another group of incumbents would take defense. The incumbents can choose to defend or abandon, and the fate of the regime is determined by the aggregate action of both groups. Therefore, coordination(between groups) matters. Those win over the conflict would reap huge fruits (such as oil, mineral or foreign aid), while the political loser should end up with nothing. Each group is defined by its military power, labor productivity, legitimacy, and information advantage. All those factors affect ex-ante probability of regime transition. The model is analytically solvable and produces rich implications fo...[
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This paper incorporates political conflict into a traditional global game framework to explain events such like civil war. A group of citizens may choose uprising during a civil war while another group of incumbents would take defense. The incumbents can choose to defend or abandon, and the fate of the regime is determined by the aggregate action of both groups. Therefore, coordination(between groups) matters. Those win over the conflict would reap huge fruits (such as oil, mineral or foreign aid), while the political loser should end up with nothing. Each group is defined by its military power, labor productivity, legitimacy, and information advantage. All those factors affect ex-ante probability of regime transition. The model is analytically solvable and produces rich implications for empirical studies. Especially, inequality hampers current regime; military advantage and information advantage do not necessarily benefit the incumbent, and their true influences depend on underlying paramters; very likely, resource windfall will ignite political struggle.
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