Political incentive is of critical importance to encourage local officials to make environmental progress in China. By exploiting the enforcement of environmental target responsibility system (TRS) after 2006, we test whether environmental performance affects the political turnover of local leaders differently. We construct a unique prefecture-level panel dataset with relatively comprehensive environmental indicators from 2004 to 2010, matched with the biographical data of city leaders. The results indicate that environmental performance does not have different effects on the promotion of mayors after 2006, while relative GDP growth rate remains the determinant factor. Moreover, environmental performance affects the promotion of mayors differently after 2006 in the East region,...[ Read more ]

Political incentive is of critical importance to encourage local officials to make environmental progress in China. By exploiting the enforcement of environmental target responsibility system (TRS) after 2006, we test whether environmental performance affects the political turnover of local leaders differently. We construct a unique prefecture-level panel dataset with relatively comprehensive environmental indicators from 2004 to 2010, matched with the biographical data of city leaders. The results indicate that environmental performance does not have different effects on the promotion of mayors after 2006, while relative GDP growth rate remains the determinant factor. Moreover, environmental performance affects the promotion of mayors differently after 2006 in the East region, while not in the Central and West Regions. For party secretaries, environmental performance is not reflected in the promotion criteria after 2006, either.

Key Words: Political Incentive, Local Leaders, Environmental Performance, Promotio