THESIS
2015
vii, 34 pages : illustrations ; 30 cm
Abstract
Political incentive is of critical importance to encourage local officials to make environmental
progress in China. By exploiting the enforcement of environmental target responsibility
system (TRS) after 2006, we test whether environmental performance affects the political
turnover of local leaders differently. We construct a unique prefecture-level panel dataset with
relatively comprehensive environmental indicators from 2004 to 2010, matched with the
biographical data of city leaders. The results indicate that environmental performance does
not have different effects on the promotion of mayors after 2006, while relative GDP growth
rate remains the determinant factor. Moreover, environmental performance affects the
promotion of mayors differently after 2006 in the East region,...[
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Political incentive is of critical importance to encourage local officials to make environmental
progress in China. By exploiting the enforcement of environmental target responsibility
system (TRS) after 2006, we test whether environmental performance affects the political
turnover of local leaders differently. We construct a unique prefecture-level panel dataset with
relatively comprehensive environmental indicators from 2004 to 2010, matched with the
biographical data of city leaders. The results indicate that environmental performance does
not have different effects on the promotion of mayors after 2006, while relative GDP growth
rate remains the determinant factor. Moreover, environmental performance affects the
promotion of mayors differently after 2006 in the East region, while not in the Central and
West Regions. For party secretaries, environmental performance is not reflected in the
promotion criteria after 2006, either.
Key Words: Political Incentive, Local Leaders, Environmental Performance, Promotio
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