By constructing a novel dataset on China's judiciaries, I examine the effect promotion incentives of provincial-level court leaders have on court effectiveness, using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits an arbitrary age threshold for promotion. The results suggest that after passing the eligibility age for promotion, provincial court leaders work less actively―the case clearance rate in their jurisdiction decreases by 1.9 to 5.4 percentage points. I argue that the effect of losing promotion opportunities leads to this reduction. The evidence highlights a striking hallmark of China's Nomenklatura, where cadre evaluation institutions are central to the variation in court effectiveness.

Keywords: Age, Promotion, Judicial Performance, Career Incentives, China

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By constructing a novel dataset on China's judiciaries, I examine the effect promotion incentives of provincial-level court leaders have on court effectiveness, using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits an arbitrary age threshold for promotion. The results suggest that after passing the eligibility age for promotion, provincial court leaders work less actively―the case clearance rate in their jurisdiction decreases by 1.9 to 5.4 percentage points. I argue that the effect of losing promotion opportunities leads to this reduction. The evidence highlights a striking hallmark of China's Nomenklatura, where cadre evaluation institutions are central to the variation in court effectiveness.

Keywords: Age, Promotion, Judicial Performance, Career Incentives, China

JEL:J45, K31, M12