THESIS
2019
xi, 94 pages : illustrations ; 30 cm
Abstract
Platforms, or two-sided markets, are proliferating in many countries and many sectors
of the economy. In these businesses, all the operational decisions are affected directly and
indirectly by the platform structure and other market participants.
In the first study, we present a model examining the endogenous platform formation
by serving consumer of competing firms. We identify the efficiency-competition trade-off
that drives the platform formation decision, and find two different selling policies, discriminatory
and independent policies, could be optimal under different market conditions.
In the second study, we analyze the impact of the used product reselling platform on
the firms used product recollection policy in remanufacturing practice. Our results show
that the secondary market...[
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Platforms, or two-sided markets, are proliferating in many countries and many sectors
of the economy. In these businesses, all the operational decisions are affected directly and
indirectly by the platform structure and other market participants.
In the first study, we present a model examining the endogenous platform formation
by serving consumer of competing firms. We identify the efficiency-competition trade-off
that drives the platform formation decision, and find two different selling policies, discriminatory
and independent policies, could be optimal under different market conditions.
In the second study, we analyze the impact of the used product reselling platform on
the firms used product recollection policy in remanufacturing practice. Our results show
that the secondary market affect trade-in and buy-back policies differently, such that
optimal recollection choice depends on the remanufacturing efficiency as well as various
market characteristics. Moreover, the existence of the secondary market may increase or
decrease firms profit.
In the third study, we consider the consumer optimal search behavior on the e-commerce
platform, where the platform is able to track the consumer search history
and share it to the sellers. We analyze the sellers' optimal pricing conditioning on search
history and the platform's optimal information control. The results show that the platform
only offers partial information to avoid both sellers being trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.
In the fourth study, we study the design of platform's recommendation system when
facing consumers who are interested in joint purchase. We show that cross-store promotion benefits the sellers by alleviates the competition under given recommendation policy, and
solve for the optimal recommendation policy.
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