This paper studies the impact of corporate ownership and group structures on analyst forecast error and analyst following in East Asia. The sample data set includes seven Asian markets. I hypothesize that the ownership and group structures have significant effects on the analyst forecast error and analyst following. Consistent with the hypotheses, I find that the analyst forecast error is positively and significantly (1% level) related to the ultimate owner's voting control and the group structure, negatively and significantly (1% level) related to the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights. I also find that the analyst following is negatively and significantly (1% level) related to the ultimate owner's voting control and the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights, positivel...[ Read more ]

This paper studies the impact of corporate ownership and group structures on analyst forecast error and analyst following in East Asia. The sample data set includes seven Asian markets. I hypothesize that the ownership and group structures have significant effects on the analyst forecast error and analyst following. Consistent with the hypotheses, I find that the analyst forecast error is positively and significantly (1% level) related to the ultimate owner's voting control and the group structure, negatively and significantly (1% level) related to the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights. I also find that the analyst following is negatively and significantly (1% level) related to the ultimate owner's voting control and the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights, positively and significantly (5% level) related to the group structure. My results indicate corporate transparency is related to ownership structure in East Asia. The results are generally robust to control for other firm characteristics, including firm size, the variance of analyst forecast and the number of segment, and the forecast horizon.